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Have We Finally Achieved Actuarial Fairness of Social Security 
Retirement Benefits and Will It Last?
Abstract
This paper develops a framework to analyze the actuarial adjustments faced by American
workers who claim Social Security benefits before or after their Full Retirement Age (FRA). We
derive the conditions under which these adjustments are “actuarially fair” (or “neutral”) and
develop measures to characterize the devi- ation from the fair form. Fair adjustment schedules
are increasing at an increasing rate in take-up age and become flatter as longevity rises. We 
document that the actuarial fit has improved across generations. Our baseline 3% discount rate
scenario estimates that the current schedule deviates from its fair form by less than 1% for 
average-mortality beneficiaries, compared to 5.1% and 4.0% for male and female beneficiaries in
1980, respectively. The improvement is largely due to the increases in the Delayed Retirement
Credit. For men, gains in life expectancy combined with the increase in the FRA also contributed 
to the improved fit. We predict that the designated increase in the FRA to age 67 will have little
effect on the actuarial fit. We investi- gate schedules reflecting (further) increases in the 
retirement ages, as recommended by the President’s 2010 Fiscal Commission, and propose
alternatives. We also discuss results from the analysis of the adjustments to spousal and 
widow(er) benefits.
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 1 Introduction 
The U.S. Social Security system is one of the largest and most comprehensive social insurance pro­
grams worldwide. In 2010, 90% of individuals age 60-64 were fully insured and $577.4 billion were 
paid in old-age retirement and survivor’s beneﬁts (SSA-S, 2010, Table 4.C5). Social Security reduces, 
by a constant percentage, the monthly beneﬁts of workers who start collecting checks before the Full 
Retirement Age (FRA), as early as age 62, the Early Retirement Age (ERA). Likewise, it increases ben­
eﬁts for those who delay take-up past FRA in accordance with the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC). 
Since the introduction of the early retirement option in 1956 (1961) for women (men), the structure 
of the actuarial adjustments (henceforth: “the adjustment schedule”) has been modiﬁed several times. 
As shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, the DRCs have been raised from 3% to 8% per year, which has 
increased the slope of the schedule after FRA. Following the 1983 Social Security Amendments, the 
FRA has increased from age 65 to 66, resulting in a wider early take-up age range (ERA FRA) relative 
to delayed take-up (FRA 70), and a lower penalty rate three years prior to FRA was introduced. The 
FRA is scheduled to rise to 67 for beneﬁciaries reaching ERA by 2022.1 
1For a comprehensive treatment of the history of Social Security legislation see Myers (1993). 
Current policy proposals, 
such as the recommendations made by President Obama’s 2010 Fiscal Commission, call for increases 
in the ERA and the FRA to age 64 and 69, respectively. Such reforms, if implemented, would lead to 
important changes in the adjustment schedule that may fundamentally alter the incentives for beneﬁt 
take-up faced by future generations of beneﬁciaries. 
These adjustments are a key feature of the program, affecting the monthly checks of millions of cur­
rent and future beneﬁciaries.2 
2Myers and Schobel (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier (1991), Myers (1993, p.52), Gruber and Orszag (2003), and 
Benı´tez-Silva and Heiland (2007, 2008), among others, discuss the rules in detail. 
They provide incentives that are fundamental to retirement planning.3 
3The retirement literature routinely models the beneﬁt adjustments as part of the trade-offs that determine labor supply 
and claiming behavior (e.g., van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008; Coile and Gruber, 2007; Benı´tez-Silva and Heiland, 2007; 
French, 2005; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002; Rust and Phelan, 1997). 
How beneﬁts are adjusted also impacts the ﬁnances of the program, since the adjustment schedule— 
together with the beneﬁciaries’ lifespans and take-up behavior—determines Social Security’s outlays.4 
4Most beneﬁciaries claim before reaching FRA, with around 50% of retirees taking up beneﬁts between age 62 and 63 
(e.g., Benı´tez-Silva and Yin, 2009). 
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Suppose, for example, that there were no penalty for claiming beneﬁts at the ERA instead of the FRA.
 
Social Security’s outlays would increase by up to FRA ERA years’ worth of beneﬁts per person (in 
present value terms). Setting an adjustment policy that makes outlays independent of take-up behavior 
for average-mortality beneﬁciaries will likely reduce outlay volatility. Hence, from a systemic perspec­
tive, it may be desirable to implement adjustments that are “actuarially fair” (or “neutral”) to Social 
Security, such that the expected discounted present value of lifetime beneﬁt payouts do not vary by age 
at take-up, on average (see Burkhauser, 1980; Myers and Schobel, 1990; Gruber and Wise, 2005).5 
5Some authors use alternative terminology to describe the same concept. Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) use the 
term actuarial neutrality, Duggan and Soares (2002) use actuarial equivalence, and Crawford and Lilien (1981) refer to 
marginal fairness. We note that the pension literature sometimes uses the term actuarial fairness when comparing beneﬁts 
and contributions (e.g., Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006; Belloni and Maccheroni, 2006). 
Demographic trends present an important backdrop to understanding changes in the adjustment 
policies. The 1983 Social Security Amendments, which led to the increase in the FRA to age 66 today, 
were motivated in part by the rapid increases in old-age longevity. Average remaining life expectancy 
at age 62 (ERA) increased from 16.5 (21.3) years to 19.6 (22.7) years for males (females) born in 
1918 compared to 1937.6 
6The values are obtained from logistic mortality trend models estimated using data from birth cohorts 1900-1948. 
As average retirement lifespans lengthen, adjustment schedules that were 
actuarially fair for average beneﬁciaries from past generations may not be fair for current retirees. On 
the other hand, an adjustment policy that was far from actuarially fair may be more congruous now. 
This motivates the questions that we seek to address in this paper: Under what conditions are the 
adjustments to beneﬁts for early and delayed take-up actuarially fair? To what degree have past policy 
changes improved the actuarial fairness of the adjustment schedule for average mortality males and 
females? How will the planned adjustment schedules perform for future beneﬁciaries under different 
demographic scenarios and are there superior adjustment policies that should also be considered? 
While we are not aware of any recent analysis by researchers at Social Security, Robert Myers, the 
chief actuary of Social Security from 1947 to 1970, and his co-author, argued in a 1990 paper that the 
penalties for early take-up associated with FRA 65 are “reasonably close to the theoretically correct 
values” (the actuarially fair ones) for beneﬁciaries retiring in 1990 and 2030 (see Myers and Schobel, 
1990, p.295).7 
7The retirement literature frequently refers to the early take-up penalties as (approximately) actuarially fair for average 
The DRC has been described as too small to be actuarially fair before reaching 8% per 
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mortality Americans. For example, Gruber andWise (2005, p.6, Footnote 2) write: Under current law, beneﬁts in the United 
States are actuarially fair between 62 and 65, but are increased less than actuarially if the receipt of beneﬁts is delayed 
beyond age 65, thus providing an incentive to leave the labor force at 65. Beneﬁts will eventually become actuarially fair 
after age 65 as well. Similar statements can be found elsewhere (e.g., Crawford and Lilien, 1981, p.515; Benı´tez-Silva and 
Heiland, 2007, p.531; and Sun and Webb, 2009, p.3). 
year (Myers and Schobel, 1990; Duggan and Soares, 2002; Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006). 
Systematic evidence on the actuarial properties of the adjustment schedules is lacking.8 
8The paper by Myers and Schobel (1990) mentioned above is one of a handful of earlier, more qualitative studies that 
focus on at most two cohorts (Blinder et al., 1980; Mirer, 1998; Liu and Rettenmaier, 2006). 
Notable 
exceptions are the studies by Duggan and Soares (2002), Queisser and Whitehouse (2006), and Shoven 
and Slavov (2014). Duggan and Soares examine the actuarial fairness across gender and earnings 
groups among actual beneﬁciaries born in 1917-1933, cohorts that all faced the same penalties for 
early take-up (FRA 65 schedule) but different DRCs ranging from 3% to 5.5%. Comparing actual 
and actuarially fair beneﬁts, they ﬁnd that men who claimed early (especially those with low earnings) 
enjoyed an actuarial premium. Women who claimed early, on the other hand, faced less than actuarially 
fair beneﬁts, owing to their longer lifespans. Queisser and Whitehouse compare the actuarial fairness of 
the average annual reductions for early and delayed beneﬁt take-up across OECD countries. Their main 
result pertaining to the U.S. is for the future adjustment schedule FRA 67. The fair average reduction 
for early take-up is estimated to be 8.2% per year, exceeding the actual penalty by 2.2 percentage points. 
Shoven and Slavov (2014) calculate the actuarial (dis)advantage of delaying receipts of Social Se­
curity beneﬁts from age 62 to later ages (up to age 70) for individuals who reside in different types 
of households (single, one-earner couple, and two-earner couple) and whose mortality differs from the 
average. They are mainly interested in the optimal take-up ages for different types of households and 
focus on the 1951 birth cohort (and the 1953 birth cohort for the second earner of the couple), which is 
the most recent cohort reaching eligibility age. In their baseline case, they ﬁnd that delay is actuarially 
advantageous for a large fraction of households. Contrasting these results to individuals born in 1900, 
they report a signiﬁcant increase in the gains from delayed take-up. 
Previous research has focused on selected adjustment policies and generations. The present study 
has a more comprehensive scope as it examines the implications of the changes in the adjustment policy 
across beneﬁciaries born between 1917 and 1960, drawing careful distinctions between the contribution 
3
 
 of the early take-up penalty structure, the DRC, and the FRA, as well as (average) cohort mortality. We
 
provide a detailed analysis of the conditions under which adjustments are actuarially fair and develop 
measures to quantify the extent and nature of the deviation from the fair form. The tools and procedures 
developed here can be applied to any adjustment schedule and demographic. 
We show that fair adjustment schedules increase at an increasing rate in the take-up age and should 
be ﬂatter when mortality is lower. We demonstrate that the ﬁt of the adjustments to worker beneﬁts 
has improved notably. We predict that the designated increase in the FRA from age 66 to age 67 will 
not signiﬁcantly alter the actuarial ﬁt, even if life expectancy continues to increase. We investigate 
the impact of further increases in retirement ages, as recommended by the President’s 2010 Fiscal 
Commission, and evaluate alternative schedules that better adhere to the curvature required by actuarial 
fairness. We also brieﬂy discuss results from the analysis of spousal and widow(er) beneﬁts. 
2 Rules of Beneﬁt Take-up and Adjustment 
2.1 Beneﬁt calculation 
Individuals aged 62 or older who have paid Social Security payroll tax for at least 10 years (if born in 
1929 or later) are eligible for retirement beneﬁts under the Social Security Old-Age (SSOA) beneﬁts 
program. The system is ﬁnanced by a tax on earnings up to a maximum. To determine the Monthly 
Beneﬁt Amount (MBA), the Social Security Administration calculates the Primary Insurance Amount 
(PIA) of a worker as a function of the worker’s average earnings subject to Social Security taxes taken 
over her 35 years of highest earnings. Since 1972, the PIA has been indexed to the Consumer Price 
Level (CPI) after age 60. 
2.2 Early and delayed take-up 
The penalties and credits for early and delayed take-up are given as percentage adjustments in beneﬁt 
levels relative to take-up at FRA. The earlier (later) beneﬁts are claimed relative to FRA, the greater 
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the cumulative penalty (credit) to beneﬁts. Formally, we denote the adjustment to full beneﬁts for early 
or delayed take-up by r(a). For take-up before FRA, r(a) will be negative as beneﬁts are reduced.9 
9Social Security uses the term Reduction Factor (RF) to describe (monthly) beneﬁts received expressed as a fraction of 
PIA, that is, RF = 1+ r. 
If 
beneﬁts are claimed at FRA, the MBA equals the PIA. If a worker starts receiving beneﬁts before the 
FRA and retires from the workforce or stays below the earnings limits prescribed by the Social Security 
Earnings Test, her MBA is permanently reduced by the penalty rate.10 
10Early Social Security beneﬁts are withheld for earnings above the limit at a rate of 50% for beneﬁciaries between age 
62 and the January of the year in which they reach the FRA, and at a rate of 33% from January of that year until the month 
they reach the FRA (SSA-S, 2005, p.19; SSA-S, 2005, Table 2.A18). In the latter period, the earnings limit is higher, 
$37,680, compared with $14,160 for the earlier period as of 2011 (SSA-S, 2011, Table 2.A29.1). Beneﬁts withheld result 
in a reduction of the penalty (r) effective after FRA. Among the 1,543,000 Americans who claimed early beneﬁts in 2010, 
103,600 (6.71%) had at least some withholding due to earnings (SSA-S, 2011, Table 6.B.5.1). Benı´tez-Silva and Heiland 
(2007, 2008) provide additional detail on the rules governing beneﬁt withholding and discuss the implications for actuarial 
fairness. Until its abolition in 2000 there was also a post-FRA Earnings Test. 
Beneﬁts are adjusted according 
to the number of months between take-up and FRA. In the three-year period leading up to the FRA, 
each month take-up is brought forward adds 5/9 of 1% to the cumulative penalty; prior to that each 
month adds 5/12 of 1%. The latter only applies to individuals born after 1937 (FRA> 65). Individuals 
claiming after the FRA earn DRCs. For those born in 1943 or later the total credit increases by 2/3 of 
1% for each month of delay. Delay past age 70 does not receive credit. For those born before 1943 the 
total credit increases at a constant 1/12 to 5/8 of 1% per month, depending on the birth year. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the statutory adjustments for take-up at exact ages 62-70 for past, 
current, and future (planned) cohorts. Figure 1 provides graphs of the adjustment schedules for selected 
cohorts. The graphical representation facilitates comparison of how the shape of the adjustment sched­
ule has changed across cohorts. The FRA and the penalties associated with early beneﬁt take-up are 
the same for Americans born between 1917 and 1937: the FRA is age 65 and beneﬁts are reduced by 
a constant 5/9 of 1% per month (6.67% per year) of earlier take-up. Following the 1983 Amendments, 
the FRA increased by 2 months per year across the 1938-1943 birth cohorts to (exact) age 66. 
A similar gradual increase is scheduled for the 1954-1960 cohorts, resulting in an FRA of age 67 
for persons born after 1959. Individuals born after 1937 see beneﬁts reduced by 5/9 of 1% per month 
(6.67% per year) of advanced take-up in the three years prior to FRA and by 5/12 of 1% per month 
(5.0% per year) prior to that. In turn, the maximal penalty has increased from 20% (=5/9*1%*36 
5
 
months) for Americans born before 1938 to 25% (=5/12*1%*12 months + 5/9*1%*36 months) for
 
current cohorts of retirees (cohorts 1943-1959) and it is scheduled to reach 30% (=5/12*1%*24 months 
+ 5/9*1%*36 months) for those born after 1959.11 
11According to Robert Myers, the chief actuary of the Social Security Administration from 1949 to 1970, the 5/9 of 1% 
per month rate of reduction introduced in legislation from 1956 was determined using linear interpolation after establishing a 
20% penalty at 62 given full beneﬁts at FRA 65 at that time (see Myers and Schobel, 1990, p.295). During the deliberations 
for the 1983 Amendments, Congress apparently also considered a proposal to gradually increase the ERA in tandem with 
the FRA by (ultimately) two years to 64. This would have shifted the penalty schedule without changing its curvature. 
Maintaining the rate of 5/9 of 1% in the three-year period before FRA and implementing a rate of 5/12 of 1% per month 
before that may have been a compromise to keep the penalty percentages at the ERA at fairly round numbers (25% and 30% 
for FRA 66 and 67, respectively) when it became clear that increasing the ERA was politically infeasible. 
The credit for delaying take-up past FRA has 
increased more gradually. Cohorts born before 1925 see beneﬁts increase by 1/4 of 1% per month (3% 
per year) of delay. For the 1925-1943 birth cohorts, this credit was raised by 1/24 of 1% (0.5% per 
year) every other year: from 7/24 of 1% per month (3.5% per year) for the 1925 cohort to 16/24 = 2/3 
of 1% (8% per year) for those born in 1943. Under current law, the credit will remain at this level. 
The vast majority of retirement beneﬁts are paid out to workers. However, individuals can also 
receive beneﬁts as the spouse or widow(er) of an eligible insured worker. While the delayed retirement 
credit only exists for worker’s beneﬁts, spousal and widow(er) beneﬁts face the same FRA but some­
what different adjustment rules for early take-up. Speciﬁcally, spouse’s beneﬁts are reduced at a rate 
of 25/36 of 1 percent for each month in the three-year period prior to FRA and at a rate of 5/12 of 1 
percent per month before that up to age 62. Survivor’s beneﬁts are payable as early as age 60 (age 50 
if disabled) and the adjustment is a constant rate of reduction reaching a cumulative 28.5% penalty if 
beneﬁts are claimed at age 60, compared to no penalty at FRA and thereafter. As shown in Figure 1, 
the rate of adjustment is 5.7% per year for FRA 65 (cohorts 1919-1939), which is smaller than for 
either spouses and workers.12 
12The FRA for widow(er)s is also increasing from 65 to 67, but the increases affect the adjustment schedule of survivors 
with a two birth year delay. Consequently, the FRA for widow(er)s born in 1939 is still exact age 65. 
Increases in the FRA have similar effects on the early take-up schedule 
of spouses and survivors as in the case of workers.13 
13Approximately 6% of the individuals who collect some type of Old Age, Survivors, or Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
beneﬁts receive them as spouses of entitled retirees. This percentage comes from the 2001 Public-Use Master Beneﬁciary 
Microdata provided by the Social Security Administration, a 1% random sample of all beneﬁciaries in December of 2001. 
For further discussion of spousal and widow(er) beneﬁts see Myers and Schobel (1990); Gustman and Steinmeier (1991, 
2000); Coile et al. (2002); Coile (2003); Munnell and Soto (2005); Sun and Webb (2009). 
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2.3 Characteristics of Social Security’s adjustment schedules 
There are three observations regarding the shape of the adjustment schedules that are most relevant to 
the analysis of actuarial fairness: 
First, all schedules are piece-wise linear with at most two bend points (“nodes”), age FRA and 
age FRA-3. (For cohorts 1917-1937, FRA equals exact age 65, resulting in only one bend point for 
workers). This implies that all schedules used by Social Security to date exhibit constant slopes over 
wide age intervals (age 62 to FRA-3 and FRA-3 to FRA for workers and spouses; FRA to 70 for workers 
only; 60 to FRA for widowers only). As the FRA increases the bend points are increasing, resulting in 
a wider early take-up penalty age range (62 to FRA for workers and spouses; 60 to FRA for widowers) 
and a shorter delayed retirement credit range for workers (FRA to 70). 
Second, for workers, the increases in the DRCs from 3% per year of delay to 6.5% across the 1924 
to 1937 cohort have changed the overall shape of the schedule from increasing at a non-increasing rate 
in take-up age (concave) for the 1917-1924 cohorts to almost perfectly linear for the 1937 cohort. 
Third, the introduction of the 5/12 of 1% per month (5% per year) penalty between 62 and FRA­
3 for worker’s and spouse’s beneﬁts, and increasing the credits for delayed retirement to 2/3 of 1% 
per month (8% per year) for worker’s, as part of the full retirement age reform, has caused the early 
penalty part to become ﬂatter and the overall shape to become more convex (increasing at a constant 
or increasing rate) in take-up age. In turn, the adjustment schedules will tend to become even ﬂatter at 
early take-up ages, as the FRA increases to age 67. This is particularly apparent for survivor’s beneﬁts, 
which will experience a drop in the annual penalty from 4.75% for FRA 66 to 4.07% for the designated 
FRA 67. 
7

 
   
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
    
  
3 Assessing Actuarial Fairness 
3.1 Fair beneﬁt adjustment 
Present value analysis 
An adjustment schedule is actuarially fair if it equalizes a person’s expected present value (PV) of 
lifetime beneﬁts for all take-up ages ERA;ERA+ 1; :::;FRA; :::;MRA. (Take-up past the “Maximum 
Retirement Age (MRA, currently 70)”, is disregarded because delay past MRA does not earn DRCs.) 
Discounting all amounts to ERA, the deﬁnition for an adjustment schedule that is fair for individuals 
with survival risk proﬁle, S(a) (probability of living to age a conditional on survival to age a 1, with 
S(ERA) = 1) and time discount rate, d, can be formally written as follows: 
FRA+D a 1 
)a ERAPVf  å Õ S(i)  (  (1+ r f (ERA)) PIA1+da=ERA i=ERA 
 
FRA+D a 
 1 
)a ERA å Õ S(i)  (  (1+ r f (ERA+1)) PIA1+da=ERA+1 i=ERA 
 :::
(1)
FRA+D a 1 
)a ERA å Õ S(i)  ( PIA1+da=FRA i=ERA 
 :::
FRA+D a 1 
)a ERA å Õ S(i)  (  (1+ r f (MRA)) PIA:1+da=MRA i=ERA 
FRA+D is the person’s maximum age (set to 110 below) and PVf denotes the fair present value. The 
set of adjustments r f (:) constitutes the actuarially fair schedule (r f (FRA) = 0 is imposed). 
Key properties of fair schedules 
Solving Equation (1), the fair adjustment for take-up at age c < FRA (“early take-up”) is: 
åFRA da ERAÕa a=c i=ERA S(i)r f (c) =  < 0: (2)
åFRA da ERAÕa a i=ERA S(i)+å
FRA+D 
a=c a=FRA da ERAÕi=ERA S(i)
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Assuming ERA = 62 and FRA = 65, the fair penalties at exact ages 62, 63, and 64 are, respectively, 
1+dS(63)+d2S(63)S(64) dS(63)+d2S(63)S(64) d2S(63)S(64) +D da 62 Õa , , and , where A å65 .1+dS(63)+d2S(63)S(64)+A dS(63)+d2S(63)S(64)+A d2S(63)S(64)+A a=65 i=62 S(i)
Similarly, the theoretically fair adjustment for delayed take-up at age c > FRA is: 
åca=FRA da ERAÕ
a 
i=ERA S(i)r f (c) = > 0: (3)
åca=FRA da ERAÕ
a
i=ERA S(i)+å
FRA+D 
i=ERA S(i)a=FRA da ERAÕ
a 
We observe that the fair adjustment schedule (i) increases at an increasing rate in take-up age and (ii) 
becomes ﬂatter, turning clockwise in FRA, as longevity increases (see Appendix I for the proof). Intu­
itively, the (strictly) convex shape of the fair schedule through FRA results from the fact that the effect 
of a reduction in the cumulative adjustment on lifetime beneﬁts will be the greater the earlier the take­
up age, because it is applied to a longer time period. If longevity increases, actuarial fairness requires 
lower adjustments for early and delayed take-up because the adjustments have a greater lifetime effect. 
(It is easy to see that an increase in the discount rate, d, has the opposite effect of mortality decline.) 
3.2 Measures of actuarial ﬁt and favorability 
To quantify the extent to which actual adjustment schedules are actuarially fair, we calculate coefﬁcients 
of variation (CV ) of the following form (in decimal): 
q
1 åB c=A[PV (c) PVFRA]2 B A 1
CVi  : (4)PVFRA 
The CV is a standard measure of the relative dispersion of a distribution around a given value (typically 
the mean). Equation (4) measures the deviation of the discounted beneﬁt stream for take-up between 
ages A and B from its fair value, PVFRA. We calculate the CV (in %) for the early adjustments (A =
ERA, B = FRA), the delayed adjustments (A = FRA, B =MRA), and the overall schedule (A = ERA, 
B=MRA).14 
14The number of comparisons or data points entering Equation (4) depends on A, B and FRA; for cohorts subject to 
interim FRAs it will be incremented by 1. 
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We also introduce a measure of the “actuarial favorability” of the adjustments. Speciﬁcally, we
 
calculate the proportion of “positive deviations,” that is, the ratio of the sum of the squared distances 
between PVFRA and PV (c)when PV (c)>PVFRA to the total deviation. This measures the favorability of 
the actual adjustments relative to the fair adjustments from the beneﬁciaries’ perspective.15 
15To obtain the absolute beneﬁt, we can simply multiply the measure by the CV (or the standard deviation about PVFRA 
to get a dollar amount). 
Graphically, 
if, for example, the early and the delayed adjustments lie above the fair schedule, then the actual 
penalties and DRCs are 100% favorable. Regardless of claiming age, beneﬁciaries would be better 
off under the actual schedule, while the SST fund would prefer implementing the fair schedule. (The 
overall % favorable is a weighted average of the early and delayed %.) 
3.3 Empirical setup 
We focus on average beneﬁciaries born in 1917-1960 and analyze males and females separately. Avail­
able cohort life table data up to 2008 from the Human Mortality Database (http://www.mortality.org/) 
are used to estimate the survival proﬁles past age 60. In our “Baseline Mortality” scenario, we assume 
that cohort mortality remains constant at 2008 levels. We contrast this lower-bound case with a “Low 
Mortality” scenario that extrapolates past improvements in mortality (e.g., Olshansky et al. 2005).16 
Our baseline discounting scenario assumes a constant annual discount rate of 3%. The value is 
chosen to be consistent with averages used by the Actuarial Ofﬁce of Social Security (AOSS) based 
on (real) yields of long-dated U.S. treasury bonds (see Girola, 2005). We also analyze a variable (real) 
discounting scenario, where the beneﬁt ﬂows of each cohort are discounted according to the (real) 
interest rate on long-term treasuries prevailing at the time. To that end, we constructed the time series 
16Speciﬁcally, using death rates after age 60 for male and female birth cohorts 1900-1948, we estimated logistic models 
of mortality with cohort trends. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the death rate, µa(i), at exact age a for the average individual in 
bgaidbirth cohort i (cohort 1900 is denoted by i= 1) takes the form: µa(i) = . This logistic form ﬁts mortality at older ages 1+bgaid
particularly well (e.g., Thatcher et al., 1998). We have enhanced the basic model with a quadratic age term and a cohort 
trend to account for mortality declines across generations. Convenient for estimation, the logit of µa(i) is linear in age, age 
2 0 2 0squared, and cohort: logit(µa(i)) = ln(b)+ ln(g1) a+ ln g a + ( )  i= b0 +g0  a +d0  i where b0  ln(b);g1 ( 2) ln d 1 a+g2 0ln(g1);g2  ln(g2) and d0  ln(d) are parameters to be estimated. Our OLS estimates (standard errors in parentheses) for 0 0men are b0 = 4:27665 (0.23952), gM;1 = 0:03217 (0.00644), gM;2 = 0:00074 (0.00004) and d0M = 0:01843 (0.00014), M 
and for women b0 =  5:03173 (0.10002), g0 : = 0 00090 (0.00002) , and d0W;1 =  0 04329 (0.00265), g0 : =  0:09984W W;2 W 
(0.0002). R-squared (adjusted) is 0.996 for males and 0.998 for females. 
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of the real interest rate shown in Figure 2, based on 1954-2012 data on average annual yields of 20-year
 
treasuries available from the Federal Reserve (www.federalreserve.gov) deﬂated by the CPI-U. Values 
after 2012 are imputed with the long-run average value of 2.68%.17 
17We also obtained the 1968-2007 interest rate time series data (based on long-dated treasuries) used by Social Security 
from AOSS. Before 1999, only 5-year averages are reported, resulting in a substantial loss of variation compared to our 
annual data. However, we calculated a long-run average real rate of 2.8% in the AOSS data, which is close to our average 
of 2.68%. (See Figure 2.) 
This rate and our 3% baseline case 
closely match values Social Security uses in its long term solvency forecast (intermediate case), where 
real interest rates stabilize at 2.9% in 2020 (SSA-T, 2009, p.101).18 
18Duggan and Soares (2002) use within-sample mortality estimates and focus on a constant annual time discount rate 
of 3% (some sensitivity analysis using 1% and 5% is conducted). Queisser and Whitehouse (2006) assume a 2% discount 
rate. Shoven and Slavov (2014) focus on the 2.9% and 0% case. In addition to the three discounting scenarios discussed 
here, we also looked at alternative discount rates, including an extreme case of 0% discounting. The spreadsheets with our 
calculations are available from the authors upon request. The spreadsheets are customizable and can be used to analyze any 
discount rate or mortality scenario. 
Discounting beneﬁt ﬂows at “risk-free” interest rates may be appropriate from the perspective of the 
Social Security Trust (SST). By law, income to the SST can only be invested in securities with federal 
interest and principal guarantees.19 
19The majority of SST funds are invested in “special-issue” bonds that mimic conventional long-dated treasuries. At 
the end of 2011, the average (nominal) annual interest rate of the OASI special-issues was 4.17% and the average time to 
maturity was 7.42 years (see http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/investheld.html). 
These rates may not coincide with rates that are realistic for aver­
age Americans trying to solve their retirement problem (see Duggan and Soares, 2002). Individuals are 
likely to discount future moneys more heavily than SST fund managers would for the following rea­
sons: higher (expected) rates of return on capital, individual-level risks related to health (e.g., morbidity 
and mortality) and economic wellbeing (e.g., unemployment and borrowing constraints), and subjective 
time preference motivations (impatience). Since we are primarily interested in the investment perspec­
tive of Social Security, we make the case of a moderate annual (real) rate of 3% our baseline scenario. 
We do explore the discount rate sensitivity by looking at a high discounting scenario where we set the 
annual discount rate to 9%, consistent with evidence of typical discount rates among retirees.20 
20The value of 9% is motivated by estimates of the distribution of discount rates among older Americans provided by 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2002). 
Some additional observations are in order. We focus on take-up at exact ages 62;63; :::;FRA; :::;70. 
With the exception of the cohorts with an “interim” FRA (1938-1942 and 1955-1959), this means 
that the calculations are based on round ages. However, the results for take-up during interim months 
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can easily be approximated. Differences in the real pension wealth across cohorts do not impact our
 
comparisons. This is because we are modeling discounted money ﬂows (risk-neutral linear utility 
retirees) rather than utility ﬂows of risk-averse consumers. As discussed in the previous paragraph this 
is the appropriate perspective for Social Security.21 
21Average (real) PIAs have increased somewhat over time, primarily due to real wage gains, rising labor supply (espe­
cially among women), and program expansion. Benı´tez-Silva and Yin (2009, p.7, Table 3) report that the average monthly 
beneﬁts (in constant 2005 dollars) among retirees of age 62 increased from $1,066 in 1994 to $1,135 in 2004. 
After age 60, the PIA is indexed to the price level 
using a cost-of-living-adjustment. We only consider the case of constant (real) PIAs. Given that the 
majority of beneﬁciaries claim between age 62 and 64 (see SSA-S, 2011, Table 6.B5), increases in the 
PIA after age 62 due to a higher earnings year replacing a lower earnings year in the past are not typical. 
4 Main Results 
Table 2 summarizes the fair adjustment schedules of average mortality male and female beneﬁciaries 
born in years 1918, 1928, 1937, 1943, and 1960 for the three discounting scenarios. (The adjustments 
based on the low mortality alternative scenario are shown in parentheses.) For example, in the baseline 
discount rate scenario (constant 3%), the total actuarially fair reduction for take-up at age 62 is 21.62% 
for men born in 1918. 
The results illustrate the theoretical properties of the fair schedule discussed in Section 3.1. The 
fair adjustments are found to be notably greater for males than for females, reﬂecting the gender-gap 
in longevity that favors women. Similarly, we observe a decline in the adjustments across birth cohorts 
1917-1937. It reﬂects the impact of increasing life expectancy, holding FRA constant. The ﬂattening of 
the fair schedule is more pronounced for men who experienced greater gains in longevity than women. 
As expected, the increase in the FRA from 65 to 66 across birth cohorts 1937-1943 has a profound 
effect on the fair schedule. A higher FRA implies higher penalties before FRA and lower credits 
thereafter. The scheduled increase in the FRA to age 67 is expected to have the same effect. Discounting 
at 3%, the fair penalties at 62 are 30.96% for men and 28.33% for women born in 1960, compared to 
25.33% for men and 23.11% for women born in 1943. The results also conﬁrm that the greater the 
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 discount rate the greater the fair adjustments.
 
4.1 Beneﬁciaries born 1917-1943: towards actuarial fairness 
Figures 3-5 show the trends in the actuarial ﬁt based on the CV for our three discount rate scenarios. In 
all scenarios, we observe a meaningful improvement in the overall actuarial ﬁt across cohorts. Among 
men, applying a 3% discount rate, CVOverall declined from 5.1% for the 1918 cohort to 0.77% for 
the 1943 cohort. For women, it declined from 4.0% to 0.45% across the same cohorts. The dramatic 
increases in the DRCs across cohorts 1924-1943 are the key contributing factor. For men, the CVDelayed 
declined from 8.14% to 1.51% across cohorts 1918-1943. The corresponding values for women are 
6.39% and 0.50%. Historically, the early adjustments are much closer to the fair form than the DRCs 
and they did not change as dramatically. For men, assuming 3% discounting, we observe a decline 
in the CVEarly from 1.12% to 0.29% across cohorts 1918-1937. For women, however, the early ﬁt 
worsened slightly up to the 1937 generation. This pattern is consistent with studies that have looked at 
more selected cohorts (e.g., Duggan and Soares, 2002). The corresponding fair penalty at 62 declined 
from 21.62% for men born in 1918 to 19.58% for men born in 1937. For women, the respective penalty 
declined from 18.53% to 17.77% over the same period. The statutory penalty at 62 is 20%, a level 
closely matching the fair percentage for the 1937 male cohort but exceeding the fair value for the 
corresponding female cohort. (See Tables 1 and 2.) 
To better understand the gender differences, consider Figure 6, which depicts the actual and the fair 
schedule for cohorts 1918 and 1943 under baseline discounting. It is clear that the statutory penalties 
were too high for average mortality men born in 1918, while they were close to fair for women with 
average longevity born in 1918. As life expectancy increased, the fair penalties declined, causing the 
ﬁt for men to improve while the ﬁt for women worsened. The current penalties are slightly too high for 
female retirees today, while they are very close to fair for men. The current DRC of 8%, on the other 
hand, remains below fair levels for males, while it matches the fair value for women, who continue to 
enjoy lower mortality than men, fairly well. 
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The results for variable discounting are very similar.22 
22In the early 1990s, Social Security actuaries claimed that rising real interest rates had effectively offset longevity gains 
(based on personal conversation). As shown in Figure 2, the long-term trend in annual real interest 1954-2012 is positive 
but the series is very volatile. Since the trend reversed in the mid-1980s it is unclear to us how actuarial fairness could have 
been maintained. Using unpublished interest and mortality data from the actuaries, a 2004 policy brief by Jivan (2004, p.2, 
Figure 3) reports that the ratio of the present values of the beneﬁt stream for take-up at age 62 to take-up at 65 was close to 
1 in the 1990s, a value interpreted as “perfect age neutrality,” and similar to levels found in the 1990s. A recent policy brief 
by Munnell and Sass (2012) updates this analysis for data up to 2010. The discount rate in the present value calculation is 
based on a constant real interest rate but it is not clear what the underlying average interest rates are. The two real interest 
rates reported are for the years 1960 and 2004 (1.4% and 3%) and do not match our values for these years (2.34% and 
2.38%), as shown in Figure 2. 
In the high discount rate scenario (9%), 
which is meant to capture the time preference of average beneﬁciaries, the ﬁt improves for both male 
and female beneﬁciaries up to the 1937-1938 birth cohort.23 
23The kink in the CV s during the transition from 65 to 66 and 66 to 67 reﬂects the additional pair that enters the calculation 
for interim FRAs. 
The high discount rate yields a steeper (and 
more curved) adjustment schedule, offsetting the impact of life expectancy and resulting in penalties 
that are less than actuarially fair even for average mortality females born in 1917. 
Figure 7 illustrates the contribution of mortality to the actuarial ﬁt for male cohorts (baseline 3% 
discounting). One set of graphs shows the deviations from the fair form assuming that mortality rates 
are constant at the level of the 1918 birth cohort. The result show that the improvements in ﬁt would 
have been signiﬁcantly smaller for men in the absence of gains in life expectancy. Speciﬁcally, we 
estimate that the deviation from fairness of the overall schedule would have fallen from 5.10% to 1.61% 
across the 1918-1943 birth cohorts. This compares to a decline in the average deviation from 5.10% 
to 0.89% across the same birth cohorts in the baseline case. Consequently, we may attribute 17.1% of 
the total observed improvement in actuarial ﬁt across male beneﬁciaries born between 1918 and 1943 
to rising life expectancy. (This ﬁgure becomes 23.0% in our low mortality scenario.) As discussed 
above, life expectancy gains have made the ﬁt worse for women since the adjustments tend to be too 
high for women, owing to their greater longevity. (We present additional evidence on the effects of life 
expectancy and the shape of the adjustment schedule on actuarial fairness in Appendix II.) 
The “Low Mortality” graphs in Figure 7 show CV s for our alternative (low) mortality scenario 
discussed above. Not surprisingly these results are more sensitive to the mortality assumptions among 
recent cohorts. We see greater adherence to actuarial fairness for the DRCs and the overall adjustment 
schedule for men when mortality is projected to continue to decline. These improvements reﬂect the 
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fact that the adjustments tend to be too low for men; rising longevity mitigates this effect by lowering
 
the fair adjustments. For women the actuarial ﬁt of the early adjustments and the schedule overall is 
generally worse under low mortality, reﬂecting the fact that the actual penalties are already very close 
to or even above the fair values for the early female cohorts (e.g., beneﬁciaries born in 1918 as shown 
in Figure 6). 
Figure 8 shows results from “actuarial favorability” analysis under baseline discounting. The big­
ger the dot (bubble), the more the actual adjustments beneﬁt the average-mortality beneﬁciary at the 
expense of the SST fund. As discussed in Section 3.2, the underlying measure of “percentage favor­
able” ranges from 0 to 100%. We ﬁnd that delayed take-up has been unfavorable (0% favorable) for 
males across generations. This implies that, for average male retirees who discount beneﬁts at 3%, 
there has never been an actuarial incentive to delay claiming past FRA. For women born prior to 1943, 
the delayed take-up schedule has also been entirely unfavorable. For female cohorts subject to FRA 
66, delayed take-up is largely unfavorable as well (18.1% favorable) and we predict a similar situation 
for future female retirees facing FRA 67. While early take-up has been actuarially favorable for the 
average male throughout the history of the system (100% favorable), it has generally been unfavorable 
for females (<2% favorable). As discussed above, for women, the penalties tend to be too large and 
the credits too small to be actuarially fair for average-mortality.24 
24We can make useful ceteris paribus deductions about other groups of beneﬁciaries by comparing their mortality de­
mographics to that of the average male retiree. For example, we can infer that for women with below average longevity— 
placing them on par with average males, early take-up has been actuarially favorable. For women with above average 
lifespan take-up after FRA has become more favorable as the DRCs rose to 8% annually. 
4.2 Fairness in the future: retirement age reform 
During the second phase of the 1983 Amendments the FRAwill increase to 67 across beneﬁciaries born 
in 1955-1960. The three-year age range prior to FRA penalizing earlier take-up at 5/9 of 1% per month 
will shift by one year and the ﬂatter range will extend to exact age 64 (see Figure 1). We predict that this 
transformation will have little impact on actuarial fairness. As shown in Figure 3, the overall deviation 
from the fair form is predicted to be 0.60% for male and 0.45% for female beneﬁciaries born in 1960 
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under baseline conditions. This compares to 0.53% for men and 0.45% for women born in 1943. If
 
longevity continues to increase, as we predict in our “LowMortality” scenario, then we expect a slightly 
(CVOverall worse overall ﬁt for the 1960 females = 0:76%) while the ﬁt for men would be about the same f ;1960 
(CVOverall = 0:59%). Under variable discounting (which applies a lower, constant 2.68% discount rate m;1960 
after 2012), we also predict a modestly improved overall ﬁt for men while the ﬁt worsens marginally for 
women. In the high discounting (9%) scenario, we ﬁnd that the early adjustments ﬁt the 1960 male and 
female cohorts worse than the cohorts facing FRA 66, while the DRCs ﬁt slightly better (see Figure 5). 
The overall ﬁt is predicted to worsen as the FRA increases because of the relatively poorer ﬁt of penalty 
part that is expanding.25 
25Assuming the extreme case of 0% discounting, we ﬁnd a similar pattern. In this case, the overall deviation from the 
fair form is 1.56% for men and 2.26% for women, respectively. 
The discussion in Myers and Schobel (1990, Footnote 3, p.296) suggests that Congress also consid­
ered a gradual increase of the ERA in tandem with the FRA at the time of the deliberations for the 1983 
Amendments. Had this been implemented, the ERA for the 1943 and 1960 cohorts would have been 63 
and 64, respectively. In that case, there would have been no need to introduce the 5/12 of 1% reduction 
per month and the slope of the penalty schedules faced by beneﬁciaries born in 1943 and 1960 would 
have been a constant 5/9 of 1% reduction per month throughout. Experiment 1 in Table 3 describes 
this counterfactual adjustment schedule for FRA 67, the corresponding actuarially fair adjustments, and 
the estimated ﬁt for the 1960 cohort under 3% discounting and different mortality developments. By 
construction, the actual and the fair adjustments to beneﬁts are identical to the currently planned FRA 
67 schedule in the age range 64 to 70. We note that the ﬁt of the early adjustments and the overall 
ﬁt can differ from the FRA 67 schedule as the present values for take-up at age 62 and 63 no longer 
enter the calculations. Since the delayed take-up schedule ﬁts marginally better than the early schedule 
for women, while the reverse is true for men under constant mortality, the described increase in the 
ERA from 62 to 64 would result in a small improvement in the overall ﬁt for women and a slightly 
worse overall ﬁt for men. If mortality rates decline at their historic pace, both women and men would 
experience a better ﬁt. 
In December 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (NCFRR) pro­
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 posed steps to address the long-run solvency problems of Social Security. The commission recom­
mended that retirement beneﬁts be reduced by indexing the retirement ages to approximate gains in 
life expectancy. Speciﬁcally, the NCFRR suggested that the ERA and the FRA be increased by one 
month every two years after FRA reaches age 67 under current law. According to their calculations, 
the ERA would increase to 63 by 2046 and 64 by 2070 while the FRA would reach 68 and 69 in those 
years. Increases in the FRA beyond age 67 will alter the adjustment schedule by extending the early 
take-up range at the expense of the DRCs. Table 3 shows the results of raising FRA to 69 with ERA 
at 62 (Experiment 2) and ERA at 64 (Experiment 3), implemented for alternative mortality scenarios 
of the 1960 cohort and 3% discounting. We focus on this cohort to simplify the comparison. Given 
the 1983 precedent, increasing only the FRA is probably the most politically feasible way to achieve 
beneﬁt reductions. Increasing the ERA is extremely inequitable as it cuts access to beneﬁts for poorer 
individuals who are less likely to continue working past age 62 and less able to afford postponement. 
We assume that in either case Congress maintains the current monthly reductions of 5/9 of 1% in the 
three-year period ending in FRA (here: 66-69) and 5/12 of 1% per month before that (here: 62/64-66). 
For women, we predict that the ﬁt would be no worse than FRA 67 in either reform scenario. For 
constant mortality, the early schedule deviates from the fair form by 0.48% and 0.20%, respectively, in 
Experiments 2 and 3 (low mortality: 1.06% and 0.70%, respectively). This compares to a CVEarly of 
0.69% (1.19%) for the FRA 67 schedule (reference). For men, we predict an improvement in the ﬁt of 
the early adjustments if longevity rises (see Table 3). (The overall ﬁt for women is predicted to worsen 
slightly in Experiment 2 if mortality declines, due to the wider penalty age range that ﬁts worse than 
the DRCs. The effect is similar for men.) 
We propose two alternative schedules for a FRA age 69 that better adhere to the convex curvature 
requirement (see Section 3.1). In Experiment 4 the monthly penalty increases geometrically from 5/14 
of 1% per additional month of earlier take-up between age 62 and 63, 5/13 of 1% between 63 and 64, to 
5/8 of 1% between 68 and 69. Between FRA and age 70, the monthly credit is 5/7 of 1%. Experiment 5 
models a ﬂatter version of this schedule, using marginal monthly penalties that increase from 5/15 to 
5/9 of 1% before FRA and a monthly credit of 5/8 of 1% after FRA. The cumulative adjustments for 
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both schedules are shown in Table 3. 
Assuming constant longevity, the steeper schedule in Experiment 4 provides a better overall ﬁt for 
men (0.81%) than the FRA 69 schedule in Experiment 2, while the ﬁt for women is the same (0.42%). 
If average lifespans continue to lengthen as predicted, the ﬂatter schedule in Experiment 5 will ﬁt both 
male (0.48%) and (particularly) female (0.21%) beneﬁciaries better than the FRA 69 schedule. The 
schedule in Experiment 5 is also the most actuarially favorable for claimers, with near 100% actuarial 
favorability overall for either sex. This is due to the fact that the fair penalties are consistently greater 
than the actual penalties (see Table 3). 
4.3 Spousal and widow(er) beneﬁts 
As discussed in Section 2, and illustrated for selected cohorts in Figure 1, spousal and survivor beneﬁts 
are adjusted differently than worker beneﬁts: The DRC does not apply and the penalty is steeper. 
Survival beneﬁts can be claimed as early as 60, resulting in a wider take-up age range compared to the 
other beneﬁt types. Also, the penalty schedule for widow(er)s has no bend point and thus ﬂattens in 
a similar fashion at all ages as FRA increases. Focusing on average females and 3% discounting, the 
early take-up schedule deviates from the fair form by approximately 3.1% for spouses and 2.5% for 
widows born in 1918. This indicates a worse ﬁt than for worker beneﬁts for the same demographic. 
As the FRA increased to age 66, the ﬁt improves to 1.77% deviation under baseline mortality (1.76% 
if mortality declines) for survivor beneﬁts in the 1945 cohort. For the 1943 females the adjustments to 
spousal beneﬁts ﬁt slightly worse than the 1918 females. The designated increases in the FRA to 67 
will likely result in adjustments that are further from the fair form for either beneﬁt type. We predict 
the adjustment to survivor’s beneﬁts to deviate by 2.54% under baseline mortality (2.11% if mortality 
declines) for the 1962 female birth cohort. The corresponding value for spousal beneﬁts is a deviation 
of 3.21% (3.69% if mortality declines). 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
 
A key result of the preceding analysis is that the actuarial ﬁt of Social Security’s beneﬁt adjustment 
schedules for workers has improved signiﬁcantly across beneﬁciaries born in 1917-1943. The improve­
ment is primarily the result of the rising DRC across the 1924-1943 birth cohorts and the widening of 
the penalty age range, which, for average mortality men, is closer to actuarial fairness than the DRC. 
Currently, the penalties for early take-up are closer to actuarially fair for average mortality males than 
females, while the reverse holds for the DRCs. We show that the penalties tend to be slightly too high 
(actuarially unfavorable) for women, while the DRCs are too small for men. This gender pattern is 
likely to continue: further declines in old-age mortality—causing the fair schedule to become ﬂatter— 
will improve the actuarial ﬁt for male beneﬁciaries but not for females. Our ﬁndings substantiate claims 
by Myers and Schobel (1990, p.295) that the penalties associated with the FRA 67 adjustment sched­
ule will be “reasonably close to the theoretically correct values” and the corresponding DRCs will be 
“approximately correct” for workers retiring in 2030. 
Historically, for the range of plausible discount rates considered here, the adjustment schedule pro­
vided a strong disincentive for individuals with average life expectancy to delay take-up past FRA 
because of the less than actuarially fair DRCs. The incentive to claim early, on the other hand, was 
favorable or neutral to average beneﬁciaries. The increases in the DRCs have made claiming after 
FRA more attractive while take-up before FRA has become relatively less attractive because of the 
demographic trends. (As discussed, this development has not been slowed meaningfully by the intro­
duction of ﬂatter adjustments before age FRA-3.) Empirically, it is well documented that the majority 
of beneﬁciaries claim beneﬁts before reaching FRA (e.g., Benı´tez-Silva and Yin, 2009). However, it 
is noteworthy that, consistent with the changing fundamentals discussed here, the percentage of retire­
ment beneﬁt awards made at ages 62-64 has declined to 57.8% for men (63% for women) in 2010 from 
66.1% for men (72.9% for women) in 1990 (see SSA-S, 2011, Table 6.B5).26 
Our ﬁnding that the adjustments are close to actuarially fair for discount rates consistent with his­
26Excluding disability conversions the corresponding percentages in 1990 and 2010 are, respectively, 73.5% (80%) and 
66.4% (71.8%) for men (women). 
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toric (average) levels of (real) interest rates of long-dated treasuries suggests that the fact that the vast 
majority of beneﬁciaries claim beneﬁts early has little long-term impact on Social Security outlays. 
The primary risk in this annuity problem is the evolution of the real interest rate, namely inﬂation and 
investment risk. If, for example, real interest rates were to remain at their current historically low levels, 
then average beneﬁciaries who claim early would provide some ﬁnancial relief to the system, as they 
accept beneﬁts that are less than actuarially fair. (We note that Social Security likely prefers delayed 
take-up from a “pay-as-you-go” or annual budgetary perspective. Also, since beneﬁt take-up is closely 
aligned with labor supply behavior, early claimers tend to contribute less than later claimers in payroll 
taxes at retirement age.) 
The previous discussion points to a potentially important systemic beneﬁt of adopting the fair ad­
justment schedule: Setting an adjustment policy that makes beneﬁt outlays independent of take-up 
behavior on average will likely reduce the volatility of total outlays (the risk faced by the Social Secu­
rity Trust resulting from the uncertain age at beneﬁt take-up). Depending on the objective, however, 
policy makers may elect a different adjustment policy. For example, if the goal is to encourage longer 
working lives, a steeper than actuarially fair schedule could be implemented to induce more delayed 
retirement. This, however, will likely conﬂict with the goal of beneﬁt equity: A steeper schedule 
(maintaining FRA) will lower beneﬁts for early claimers who may have below-average longevity and 
retirement wealth. 
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Appendix I: Proof 
This appendix provides a proof of the result stated in Section 3.1 that the actuarially fair adjustments are 
smaller when life expectancy is greater. We derive the effect of an increase in the period-survival risk, 
S( j) (for j 2 fERA; :::;FRA+Dg), on the fair adjustment at early take-up age c< FRA, r f (c). We need 
to show that r f (c), which is negative for c< FRA, increases (that is, it moves closer to 0) as the period­
survival risk increases. The fair adjustment schedule for early take-up (see Equation (2)) can be written 
A A åFRA da ERA Õa 	 B åFRA+D a ERA aas r(c) = A+B , where i=ERA S(i)> 0 and 	 Õi=ERA S i ( )> 0.a=c a=FRA+1 d  
 1 
=c da ERAÕaDeﬁne R åaj i=ERA S(i)> 0 if j > c and R 0 if j  c. 
dA B A dB dr(c) dS( j)   dS( j)= dS( j) (A+B)2 
Case 1 ( j > FRA): 
B B 
0B A  AS( j) S( j)= 
(A+B)2 =  (A+B)2 > 0 
Case 2 ( j  FRA): 
dA B A B 
  
=  dS( j) S( j) dB åFRA +D da ERA Õa 	 1 FRA+D a ERA a
 (A+B)2 (since 	 = a=FRA+1 = ; =6 S(i) = S( j)åa=FRA+1 d   Õi=ERA S i ( ))dS( j)	 i ERA i j 
(A R)B  AB

 S( j) S( j) dA FRA da ERA a 1 FRA da ERA a

 = 
(A B )2 (since = åa=max j;c	 6 j S i ( ) = åa=max j;c
 S(i)+	 dS( j) Õi=ERA;i= S( j) Õi=ERA 
1 j 1 a ERA a 
 =   a Õi=ERA S(i) if j > c and R= 0 if j (A R) with R= å	 =c d c)S( j)
= B R 0 (holds with strict inequality if j > c).S( j)
q.e.d. 
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Appendix II: Fairness decomposition analysis 
To further analyze the effect of the adjustment schedule and longevity on actuarial fairness, we con­
ducted multivariate regression analyses. Using Equation (4) we calculated the overall deviation from 
actuarial fairness across cohorts 1917-1960 by sex, mortality scenario, and interest rate environment. 
We considered 10 constant interest rate proﬁles, ranging from 0% to 9%. We regressed the log of % 
overall deviation on economic factors (interest rate and interest rate squared), demographics (life ex­
pectancy at 62), and variables characterizing the adjustment policy (cumulative credit at various take-up 
ages). (In this model, we cannot identify the effect of gender separately because all gender heterogene­
ity is captured by the longevity variable.) 
Table Appendix II shows results for three speciﬁcations, separately for baseline mortality and low 
mortality. Model 1 is the most parsimonious policy speciﬁcation, only accounting for credits at age 62 
and 70. Model 2 controls for credits at interim ages identiﬁed by the schedule changes that apply to 
the 1917-1960 cohorts. Model 3 adds an interaction terms between longevity and credit at age 62 and 
70 to the speciﬁcation in Model 1. Collectively, the three sets of factors (plus a constant terms) explain 
over 80% of the variation in actuarial fairness (in logs), indicating that this regression provides a good 
linear approximation to the true model (Equation (4)). 
We ﬁnd that the policy variables and longevity combined contribute about 44% of the observed 
changes in fairness across cohorts. The discount rate explains the remaining 56%. At up to 10% of 
the total explained variation, changes in life expectancy are making a meaningful contribution to the 
actuarial ﬁt, consistent with the results in Section 4.1. At a given discount rate, an adjustment schedule 
is marginally closer to actuarial fairness for cohorts with greater longevity. According toModel 1, under 
baseline mortality conditions, a one year increase in life expectancy improves the ﬁt by 4%. The effect 
is more pronounced in the low mortality case, perhaps capturing the greater variability in lifespans in 
these data. The analysis also conﬁrms the earlier result that a higher discount rate is associated with a 
worse ﬁt, on average. Policy makers can use the estimated relationships in Table Appendix II as a quick 
way to predict how close a particular schedule is to actuarial fairness under different interest rates for a 
given demographic. 
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Table 1: Workers’ Beneﬁt Adjustment Schedulea, All Cohorts 
Exact Age at Beneﬁt Take-up 
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 Birth Cohort 
FRA 65 
1917-1924 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 12.00 15.00 
1925-1926 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 3.50 7.00 15.00 14.00 17.50 
1927-1928 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 4.00 8.00 12.00 16.00 20.00 
1929-1930 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 4.50 9.00 13.50 18.00 22.50 
1931-1932 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 
1933-1934 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 5.50 11.00 16.50 22.00 27.50 
1935-1936 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 6.00 12.00 18.00 24.00 30.00 
1937 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 6.50 13.00 19.50 26.00 32.50 
FRA 65 and 2 months 
1938 -20.83 -14.44 -7.78 -1.11 5.42 11.92 18.42 24.92 31.42 
FRA 65 and 4 months 
1939 -21.67 -15.56 -8.89 -2.22 4.67 11.67 18.67 25.67 32.67 
FRA 65 and 6 months 
1940 -22.50 -16.67 -10.00 -3.33 3.50 10.50 17.50 24.50 31.50 
FRA 65 and 8 months 
1941 -23.33 -17.78 -11.11 -4.44 2.50 10.00 17.50 25.00 32.50 
FRA 65 and 10 months 
1942 -24.17 -18.89 -12.22 -5.55 1.25 8.75 16.25 23.75 31.25 
FRA 66 
1943-1954 -25.00 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 8.00 16.00 24.00 32.00 
FRA 66 and 2 months 
1955 -25.83 -20.83 -14.44 -7.78 -1.11 6.67 14.67 22.67 30.67 
FRA 66 and 4 months 
1956 -26.67 -21.67 -15.56 -8.89 -2.22 5.33 13.33 21.33 29.33 
FRA 66 and 6 months 
1957 -27.50 -22.50 -16.67 -10.00 -3.33 4.00 12.00 20.00 28.00 
FRA 66 and 8 months 
1958 -28.33 -23.33 -17.78 -11.11 -4.44 2.67 10.67 18.67 26.67 
FRA 66 and 10 months 
1959 -29.17 -24.17 -18.89 -12.22 -5.55 1.33 9.33 17.33 25.33 
FRA 67 
1960+ -30.00 -25.00 -20.00 -13.33 -6.67 0.00 8.00 16.00 24.00 
Notes: aThe percentage by which beneﬁts are increased at a given take-up age relative to take-up at FRA. Americans born in 1937 are the last cohort 
facing an FRA of exactly 65 years. Those born in 1943 are in the ﬁrst generation subject to an FRA of exactly 66 years. The 1960 birth cohort is the ﬁrst 
cohort facing an FRA of 67 years. 
Exact Age at Beneﬁt Take-up 
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Discount Rate 
Constant 3% 
1918 Birth Cohort (62 in 1980) 
Men 
-21.62 (-21.61) -15.18 (-15.18) -8.02 (-8.01) 0.00 9.00 (8.99) 19.12 (19.11) 30.57 (30.55) 43.55 (43.52) 58.33 (58.28) 
Constant 9% -31.69 (-31.68) -22.60 (-22.60) -12.13 (-12.13) 0.00 14.10 (14.09) 30.53 (30.52) 49.75 (49.74) 72.32 (72.31) 98.92 (98.90) 
Real Interestb -22.90 (-22.89) -15.99 (-15.98) -8.21 (-8.20) 0.00 8.53 (8.53) 17.56 (17.54) 27.40 (27.38) 38.77 (38.74) 52.04 (51.99) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-18.53 (-18.54) -12.93 (-12.93) -6.78 (-6.78) 0.00 7.49 (7.49) 15.79 (15.79) 25.01 (25.02) 35.31 (35.32) 46.84 (46.85) 
Constant 9% -28.80 (-28.80) -20.39 (-20.40) -10.86 (-10.86) 0.00 12.40 (12.40) 26.59 (26.59) 42.89 (42.89) 61.67 (61.67) 83.38 (83.39) 
Real Interestb -19.31 (-19.32) -13.36 (-13.37) -6.80 (-6.80) 0.00 6.94 (6.94) 14.15 (14.16) 21.90 (21.91) 30.70 (30.71) 40.79 (40.81) 
Constant 3% 
1928 Birth Cohort (62 in 1990) 
Men 
-20.39 (-20.34) -14.28 (-14.24) -7.51 (-7.49) 0.00 8.37 (8.34) 17.71 (17.65) 28.19 (28.08) 39.98 (39.81) 53.29 (53.04) 
Constant 9% -30.59 (-30.58) -21.76 (-21.75) -11.64 (-11.63) 0.00 13.42 (13.41) 28.92 (28.90) 46.91 (46.87) 67.85 (67.78) 92.29 (92.19) 
Real Interestb -19.46 (-19.41) -13.50 (-13.46) -6.99 (-6.97) 0.00 7.89 (7.87) 16.03 (15.97) 25.16 (25.06) 35.26 (35.12) 45.91 (45.71) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-18.08 (-18.09) -12.60 (-12.61) -6.59 (-6.60) 0.00 7.26 (7.27) 15.28 (15.31) 24.17 (24.21) 34.06 (34.11) 45.08 (45.16) 
Constant 9% -28.41 (-28.43) -20.10 (-20.11) -10.69 (-10.69) 0.00 12.16 (12.18) 26.04 (26.07) 41.93 (41.98) 60.17 (60.26) 81.17 (81.31) 
Real Interestb -17.07 (-17.09) -11.78 (-11.79) -6.07 (-6.08) 0.00 6.78 (6.79) 13.69 (13.71) 21.35 (21.39) 29.75 (29.81) 38.52 (38.60) 
Constant 3% 
1937 Birth Cohort (62 in 1999)d 
Men 
-19.58 (-19.32) -13.69 (-13.50) -7.19 (-7.08) 0.00 7.98 (7.84) 16.86 (16.55) 26.80 (26.25) 37.94 (37.11) 50.51 (49.30) 
Constant 9% -29.73 (-29.63) -21.10 (-21.02) -11.26 (-11.21) 0.00 12.91 (12.84) 27.76 (27.60) 44.91 (44.61) 64.78 (64.30) 87.91 (87.16) 
Real Interestb -18.38 (-18.13) -12.80 (-12.62) -6.70 (-6.60) 0.00 7.13 (7.01) 15.26 (15.97) 24.40 (23.91) 35.38 (34.61) 47.53 (46.40) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-17.77 (-17.73) -12.37 (-12.34) -6.47 (-6.46) 0.00 7.12 (7.09) 14.96 (14.92) 23.65 (23.57) 33.29 (33.16) 44.03 (43.86) 
Constant 9% -28.09 (-28.10) -19.85 (-19.86) -10.54 (-10.55) 0.00 11.97 (11.98) 25.60 (25.62) 41.16 (41.20) 58.99 (59.05) 79.50 (79.59) 
Real Interestb -16.65 (-16.61) -11.55 (-11.52) -6.02 (-6.01) 0.00 6.36 (6.34) 13.55 (13.50) 21.56 (21.49) 31.09 (30.97) 41.51 (41.34) 
Constant 3% 
1943 Birth Cohort (62 in 2005)e 
Men 
-25.33 (-24.57) -19.92 (-19.28) -13.95 (-13.47) -7.34 (-7.07) 0.00 8.18 (7.83) 17.34 (16.53) 27.63 (26.22) 39.24 (37.06) 
Constant 9% -37.54 (-37.16) -29.94 (-29.60) -21.28 (-21.01) -11.37 (-11.21) 0.00 13.09 (12.85) 28.20 (27.62) 45.74 (44.64) 66.17 (64.33) 
Real Interestb -24.75 (-23.98) -19.53 (-18.92) -13.83 (-13.34) -7.46 (-7.17) 0.00 7.25 (6.93) 15.99 (15.23) 27.12 (25.70) 40.23 (37.90) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-23.11 (-22.91) -18.10 (-17.94) -12.62 (-12.50) -6.61 (-6.54) 0.00 7.30 (7.21) 15.38 (15.17) 24.36 (24.00) 34.38 (33.80) 
Constant 9% -35.62 (-35.58) -28.30 (-28.26) -20.02 (-19.99) -10.65 (-10.63) 0.00 12.13 (12.10) 25.99 (25.91) 41.88 (41.71) 60.16 (59.84) 
Real Interestb -22.55 (-22.34) -17.76 (-17.59) -12.49 (-12.36) -6.71 (-6.64) 0.00 6.46 (6.38) 14.19 (13.99) 23.90 (23.52) 35.18 (34.55) 
Constant 3% 
1960 Birth Cohort (62 in 2022) f 
Men 
-30.96 (-27.77) -25.97 (-23.15) -20.45 (-18.11) -14.35 (-12.61) -7.56 (-6.60) 0.00 8.46 (7.26) 17.98 (15.26) 28.71 (24.10) 
Constant 9% -44.74 (-42.53) -38.03 (-35.98) -30.38 (-28.58) -21.62 (-20.22) -11.57 (-10.75) 0.00 13.37 (12.23) 28.88 (26.19) 46.94 (42.16) 
Real Interestb -30.19 (-26.96) -25.31 (-22.45) -19.93 (-17.56) -13.97 (-12.22) -7.36 (-6.39) 0.00 8.22 (7.01) 17.46 (14.74) 27.86 (23.27) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-28.33 (-27.09) -23.67 (-22.57) -18.57 (-17.66) -12.96 (-12.29) -6.80 (-6.43) 0.00 7.53 (7.07) 15.90 (14.86) 25.24 (23.47) 
Constant 9% -42.57 (-41.77) -36.05 (-35.30) -28.67 (-28.01) -20.31 (-19.80) -10.82 (-10.52) 0.00 12.36 (11.94) 26.53 (25.54) 42.83 (41.07) 
Real Interestb -27.55 (-26.29) -23.00 (-21.89) -18.03 (-17.11) -12.59 (-11.91) -6.60 (-6.22) 0.00 7.30 (6.83) 15.40 (14.35) 24.43 (22.66) 
Table 2: Fair Adjustment Schedulea, Men and Women, Selected Cohorts 
Exact Age at Beneﬁt Take-up 
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Discount Rate 
Constant 3% 
1918 Birth Cohort (62 in 1980) 
Men 
-21.62 (-21.61) -15.18 (-15.18) -8.02 (-8.01) 0.00 9.00 (8.99) 19.12 (19.11) 30.57 (30.55) 43.55 (43.52) 58.33 (58.28) 
Constant 9% -31.69 (-31.68) -22.60 (-22.60) -12.13 (-12.13) 0.00 14.10 (14.09) 30.53 (30.52) 49.75 (49.74) 72.32 (72.31) 98.92 (98.90) 
Real Interestb -22.90 (-22.89) -15.99 (-15.98) -8.21 (-8.20) 0.00 8.53 (8.53) 17.56 (17.54) 27.40 (27.38) 38.77 (38.74) 52.04 (51.99) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-18.53 (-18.54) -12.93 (-12.93) -6.78 (-6.78) 0.00 7.49 (7.49) 15.79 (15.79) 25.01 (25.02) 35.31 (35.32) 46.84 (46.85) 
Constant 9% -28.80 (-28.80) -20.39 (-20.40) -10.86 (-10.86) 0.00 12.40 (12.40) 26.59 (26.59) 42.89 (42.89) 61.67 (61.67) 83.38 (83.39) 
Real Interestb -19.31 (-19.32) -13.36 (-13.37) -6.80 (-6.80) 0.00 6.94 (6.94) 14.15 (14.16) 21.90 (21.91) 30.70 (30.71) 40.79 (40.81) 
Constant 3% 
1928 Birth Cohort (62 in 1990) 
Men 
-20.39 (-20.34) -14.28 (-14.24) -7.51 (-7.49) 0.00 8.37 (8.34) 17.71 (17.65) 28.19 (28.08) 39.98 (39.81) 53.29 (53.04) 
Constant 9% -30.59 (-30.58) -21.76 (-21.75) -11.64 (-11.63) 0.00 13.42 (13.41) 28.92 (28.90) 46.91 (46.87) 67.85 (67.78) 92.29 (92.19) 
Real Interestb -19.46 (-19.41) -13.50 (-13.46) -6.99 (-6.97) 0.00 7.89 (7.87) 16.03 (15.97) 25.16 (25.06) 35.26 (35.12) 45.91 (45.71) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-18.08 (-18.09) -12.60 (-12.61) -6.59 (-6.60) 0.00 7.26 (7.27) 15.28 (15.31) 24.17 (24.21) 34.06 (34.11) 45.08 (45.16) 
Constant 9% -28.41 (-28.43) -20.10 (-20.11) -10.69 (-10.69) 0.00 12.16 (12.18) 26.04 (26.07) 41.93 (41.98) 60.17 (60.26) 81.17 (81.31) 
Real Interestb -17.07 (-17.09) -11.78 (-11.79) -6.07 (-6.08) 0.00 6.78 (6.79) 13.69 (13.71) 21.35 (21.39) 29.75 (29.81) 38.52 (38.60) 
Constant 3% 
1937 Birth Cohort (62 in 1999)d 
Men 
-19.58 (-19.32) -13.69 (-13.50) -7.19 (-7.08) 0.00 7.98 (7.84) 16.86 (16.55) 26.80 (26.25) 37.94 (37.11) 50.51 (49.30) 
Constant 9% -29.73 (-29.63) -21.10 (-21.02) -11.26 (-11.21) 0.00 12.91 (12.84) 27.76 (27.60) 44.91 (44.61) 64.78 (64.30) 87.91 (87.16) 
Real Interestb -18.38 (-18.13) -12.80 (-12.62) -6.70 (-6.60) 0.00 7.13 (7.01) 15.26 (15.97) 24.40 (23.91) 35.38 (34.61) 47.53 (46.40) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-17.77 (-17.73) -12.37 (-12.34) -6.47 (-6.46) 0.00 7.12 (7.09) 14.96 (14.92) 23.65 (23.57) 33.29 (33.16) 44.03 (43.86) 
Constant 9% -28.09 (-28.10) -19.85 (-19.86) -10.54 (-10.55) 0.00 11.97 (11.98) 25.60 (25.62) 41.16 (41.20) 58.99 (59.05) 79.50 (79.59) 
Real Interestb -16.65 (-16.61) -11.55 (-11.52) -6.02 (-6.01) 0.00 6.36 (6.34) 13.55 (13.50) 21.56 (21.49) 31.09 (30.97) 41.51 (41.34) 
Constant 3% 
1943 Birth Cohort (62 in 2005)e 
Men 
-25.33 (-24.57) -19.92 (-19.28) -13.95 (-13.47) -7.34 (-7.07) 0.00 8.18 (7.83) 17.34 (16.53) 27.63 (26.22) 39.24 (37.06) 
Constant 9% -37.54 (-37.16) -29.94 (-29.60) -21.28 (-21.01) -11.37 (-11.21) 0.00 13.09 (12.85) 28.20 (27.62) 45.74 (44.64) 66.17 (64.33) 
Real Interestb -24.75 (-23.98) -19.53 (-18.92) -13.83 (-13.34) -7.46 (-7.17) 0.00 7.25 (6.93) 15.99 (15.23) 27.12 (25.70) 40.23 (37.90) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-23.11 (-22.91) -18.10 (-17.94) -12.62 (-12.50) -6.61 (-6.54) 0.00 7.30 (7.21) 15.38 (15.17) 24.36 (24.00) 34.38 (33.80) 
Constant 9% -35.62 (-35.58) -28.30 (-28.26) -20.02 (-19.99) -10.65 (-10.63) 0.00 12.13 (12.10) 25.99 (25.91) 41.88 (41.71) 60.16 (59.84) 
Real Interestb -22.55 (-22.34) -17.76 (-17.59) -12.49 (-12.36) -6.71 (-6.64) 0.00 6.46 (6.38) 14.19 (13.99) 23.90 (23.52) 35.18 (34.55) 
Constant 3% 
1960 Birth Cohort (62 in 2022) f 
Men 
-30.96 (-27.77) -25.97 (-23.15) -20.45 (-18.11) -14.35 (-12.61) -7.56 (-6.60) 0.00 8.46 (7.26) 17.98 (15.26) 28.71 (24.10) 
Constant 9% -44.74 (-42.53) -38.03 (-35.98) -30.38 (-28.58) -21.62 (-20.22) -11.57 (-10.75) 0.00 13.37 (12.23) 28.88 (26.19) 46.94 (42.16) 
Real Interestb -30.19 (-26.96) -25.31 (-22.45) -19.93 (-17.56) -13.97 (-12.22) -7.36 (-6.39) 0.00 8.22 (7.01) 17.46 (14.74) 27.86 (23.27) 
Constant 3% 
Women 
-28.33 (-27.09) -23.67 (-22.57) -18.57 (-17.66) -12.96 (-12.29) -6.80 (-6.43) 0.00 7.53 (7.07) 15.90 (14.86) 25.24 (23.47) 
Constant 9% -42.57 (-41.77) -36.05 (-35.30) -28.67 (-28.01) -20.31 (-19.80) -10.82 (-10.52) 0.00 12.36 (11.94) 26.53 (25.54) 42.83 (41.07) 
Real Interestb -27.55 (-26.29) -23.00 (-21.89) -18.03 (-17.11) -12.59 (-11.91) -6.60 (-6.22) 0.00 7.30 (6.83) 15.40 (14.35) 24.43 (22.66) 
Notes: aThe numbers represent the percentage by which full beneﬁts would have to be adjusted for a given take-up age and discounting scenario. The adjustments are actuarially fair in the sense that they 
force the expected present value of the lifetime beneﬁt stream (discounted to age 62) initiated at the given age to be the same as for take-up at FRA. The numbers in parentheses represent the fair adjustment 
calculated using our projected mortality (“Low Mortality” scenario). bFor the 1970-2012 period we use the actual annual real interest rate of long term treasuries. After 2012 we use a constant annual rate 
of 2.68%, the average over the 1954-2012 period. 
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Table Appendix II.Multivariate Analysis of Actuarial Fita, Cohorts 1917-1960 
Baseline (Constant Mortality) Low Mortality 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Regressors 
Interest Rate 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
(1.22) (1.21) (1.22) (1.22) (1.21) (1.22) 
Interest Rate Squared 116.31 116.31 116.31 116.31 116.31 116.31
(11.74) (11.67) (11.74) (11.75) (11.67) (11.75) 
Life Expectancy -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 
Credit at Age 62 0.07 -14.46 0.13 0.06 -12.62 0.12
(0.00) (8.53) (0.05) (0.00) (8.53) (0.07) 
Credit at Age 63 5.42 5.12 
(4.95) (4.94) 
Credit at Age 64 5.84 4.80 
(5.55) (5.55) 
Credit at Age 66 -6.68 -6.30 
(6.19) (6.19) 
Credit at Age 67 8.42 7.84 
(8.32) (8.32) 
Credit at Age 70 -0.04 -2.07 -0.02 -0.04 -1.91 -0.01 
(0.00) (2.09) (0.02) (0.00) (2.09) (0.02) 
Credit 62 x Life Expectancy 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Credit 70 x Life Expectancy 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant Term 3.96 -175.53 4.88 3.79 -149.56 4.51
(0.12) (113.07) (0.91) (0.11) (113.09) (1.27) 
R-Squared 0.825 0.828 0.825 0.824 0.828 0.825 
% Variation Explained by: 
Economic Variable(s) 55.64 55.55 55.62 55.67 55.45 55.65 
Demographic Variable(s) 5.23 3.41 2.84 10.44 5.93 5.74 
Policy Variable(s) 39.13 41.13 20.53 33.89 38.62 18.23 
Interaction Terms 0.00 0.00 21.01 0.00 0.00 20.39 
Notes: aDependent variable is the proximity to actuarial fairness (in logs) as measured by the CV (in %). 
Statistically signiﬁcant at the .10 level; at the .05 level; at the .01 level. 
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
B
e
n
e
fi
t 
A
d
ju
st
m
e
n
t 
(%
 o
f 
F
u
ll
 B
e
n
e
fi
ts
) 
Age at Benefit Take up 
1917-1937: Spouse's (-8.33%, FRA 65, +0%)
1943-1954: Spouse's (-5%/8.33%, FRA 66, +0%)
1960+: Spouse's (-5%/8.33%, FRA 67, +0%)
1919-1939: Survivor's (-5.7%, FRA 65, +0%)
1945-1956: Survior's (-4.75%, FRA 66, +0%)
1962: Survior's (-4.07%, FRA 67, +0%)
1917-1924: Old-Age (-6.67%, FRA 65, +3%)
1931-1932: Old-Age (-6.67%, FRA 65, +5%)
1937: Old-Age (-6.67%, FRA 65, +6.5%)
1943-1954: Old-Age (-5%/6.67%, FRA 66, +8%)
1960+: Old-Age (-5%/6.67%, FRA 67, +8%)
1954-2012 Trendline: r = 0.0232 * year - 43.313
R² = 0.0321 (Average Annual Real Yield = 2.68%)
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 A
n
n
u
a
l 
R
e
a
l 
In
te
re
s
t 
R
a
te
 (
in
 %
)
Year
1955-'69 Trend (Avg=2.11%)
1965-'79 Trend (Avg=0.90%)
1975-'89 Trend (Avg=3.49%)
1984-'98 Trend (Avg=4.77%)
1990-'04 Trend (Avg=3.67%)
Figure 1: Beneﬁt Adjustment Schedules for Workers (Old-Age), Spouses, and Widow(er)s (Survivors), 
Selected Cohorts. (In parentheses: annual early and delayed adjustment percentages.) 
Figure 2: Average Annual Real Interest Rate of 20-year Constant Coupon Treasuries, Long-run and 
15-year Linear Trends. 
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Figure 3: Deviation from Actuarial Fairness, Men and Women, 3% Discount Rate, Baseline Mortality.
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Figure 4: Deviation from Actuarial Fairness, Men and Women, Real Interest Rate Discounting, Base­
line Mortality. 
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Figure 5: Deviation from Actuarial Fairness, Men and Women, 9% Discount Rate, Baseline Mortality.
 
 
Figure 6: Actual and Actuarially Fair Adjustment Schedules, Men and Women, 1918 and 1943 Cohort, 
3% Discount Rate, Baseline Mortality. 
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Figure 7: Deviation from Actuarial Fairness, Alternative Mortality Scenarios (Baseline, LowMortality, 
1918 Mortality), Men, 3% Discount Rate. 
Figure 8: Actuarially Favorable Deviation for Claimers, Men and Women, 3% Discount Rate, Baseline 
Mortality. 
